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Abstract
This Comment argues that prevailing principles of statutory construction compel the applica-
tion of Title VII to the employment of U.S. citizens abroad by U.S. employers. Part I summarizes
the factual background and legal analysis of the Boureslan [v. Aramco] decision. Part II examines
the legal principles that govern the extraterritorial application of U.S. statutes. Part III argues that
Congress intended Title VII to apply abroad and that international law permits such application.
The Comment concludes that extraterritorial application of Title VII is necessary to secure all U.S.
citizens the freedoms that Congress intended.
COMMENT
BOURESLAN v. ARAMCO: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY FOR U.S. CITIZENS ABROAD*
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Title VII") 1 to remedy racial, religious, sex, and ethnic dis-
crimination in employment.2 Although Title VII does not af-
firmatively state the geographical limits of its application,
courts have construed it to protect all U.S. citizens from dis-
crimination by U.S. companies regardless of the place of em-
ployment.' The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, how-
* This Comment received the 1989 Foyen & Peri Award at the Fordham
University School of Law.
1. Pub. L. No. 85-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
2. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 26, reprinted in 1964 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2391, 2401 ("The purpose of [Title VII] is to eliminate
.. .discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, or national ori-
gin."). The essence of Title VII is § 704(a), which declares that it shall be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974)
("Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... to assure equality of
employment opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that discrimi-
nate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." (citation omitted).
3. See, e.g., Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F. Supp. 590, 592 (D. Md. 1986)
(hearing U.S. employees' sex-discrimination suit against U.S. employer in West Ger-
many); Bryant v. International Schools Servs., 502 F. Supp. 472, 482-83 (D.NJ.
1980), rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982) (hearing U.S. teachers' sex
discrimination suit against U.S. school in Iran); Love v. Pullman Co., 13 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423, 426 n.4 (D. Colo. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1074
(10th Cir. 1978) (barring Canadian porters' discrimination suit against railroad but
stating that Title VII protects U.S. citizens employed abroad); 'see also Kern v.
Dynalectron, 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983), aft'd, 746 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (applying Title VII to discrimination suit brought by U.S. citizen employed in
Saudi Arabia without explicitly addressing threshold question of Title VII's extrater-
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ever, recently held in Boureslan v. Aramco4 that Title VII has no
extraterritorial application. This unprecedented holding frus-
trates Congress's intent to afford equal employment opportu-
nity to all U.S. citizens5 and derogates from the growing inter-
national consensus against employment discrimination. 6
This Comment argues that prevailing principles of statu-
ritorial jurisdiction). See generally C. SULLIVAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 1.10.4
(2d ed. 1988) (discussing history of Title VII's extraterritorial application).
4. 857 F.2d 1014, reh'g en banc granted, 863 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1988).
5. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-30 (1971) (Congress enacted
Title VII to remove impediments to equal employment opportunity for all).
6. Several international agreements condemn employment discrimination. For
example, the International Labor Organization Convention Concerning Discrimina-
tion in Respect of Employment and Occupation, opened for signature June 25, 1958,
362 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Convention Concerning Employment Discrimination],
censures discrimination on the basis of "race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, na-
tional extraction or social origin" and states that each member state shall "declare and
pursue a national policy designed to promote, by methods appropriate to national
conditions and practice, equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and
occupation, with a view to eliminating any discrimination in respect thereof." Id. at 32,
34 (emphasis added).
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrim-
ination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter Convention
on Racial Discrimination] defines "racial discrimination" to include "any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic
origin .... Id. at 216 (emphasis added). States parties to this convention condemn
racial discrimination and "undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimina-
tion in all its forms" and to guarantee to everyone equality before the law in the
enjoyment of certain enumerated rights, including "[t]he rights to work, to free
choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work, to protection against
unemployment, to equal pay for equal work, [and] to just and favourable remuneration."
Id. at 220, 222 (emphasis added).
States parties to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 33 [hereinafter Con-
vention on Discrimination Against Women], condemn discrimination on the basis of
sex and
shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against wo-
men in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of
men and women, the same rights, in particular:
The right to the same employment opportunities, including the application of the
same criteria for selection in matters of employment.
Id. at 39 (emphasis added); see infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text (further
discussion of these international agreements); 1 THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (P. Alston ed. 1982) (discussing the emergence of human rights as an
international legal objective and discussing selected international human rights in-
struments); Dehner, Multinational Enteiprise and Racial .on-Discriinination: L'nited States
Enforcement of an International Human Rigit, 15 HARV. INT'L L.J. 71, 92 (1974) (nearly
all nations condemn racial discrimination; most prohibit public and private discrimi-
nation by constitution or statute). But see E. RHOODIE, DISCRIMINATION IN THE CON-
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tory construction compel the application of Title VII to the
employment of U.S. citizens abroad by U.S. employers. Part I
summarizes the factual background and legal analysis of the
Boureslan decision. Part II examines the legal principles that
govern the extraterritorial application of U.S. statutes. Part III
argues that Congress intended Title VII to apply abroad and
that international law permits such application. This Com-
ment concludes that extraterritorial application of Title VII is
necessary to secure to all U.S. citizens the freedoms that Con-
gress intended.
I. BOURESLAN V. ARAMCO
In 1980, Ali Boureslan, a naturalized U.S. citizen, began
work in Saudi Arabia with Arabian American Oil Company
("Aramco"), a U.S. corporation.7 According to Mr. Boureslan,
in 1982, his supervisor initiated a "campaign of harassment"
against him that consisted of racial, religious, and ethnic slurs.8
This campaign resulted in the termination of his employment
in June 1984. 9 After his discharge, Mr. Boureslan initiated suit
against Aramco pursuant to Title VII in the District Court for
the Southern District of Texas.' 0 In his suit, Mr. Boureslan al-
leged that Aramco violated Title VII by discharging him be-
cause of his race, religion, and national origin."
As the alleged discrimination occurred outside the United
STITUTIONS OF THE WORLD (1984) (discussing anomalous cases of institutionalized
discrimination in selected constitutions from around the world).
7. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1016. In 1979, Mr. Boureslan began work as an engi-
neer for Aramco Services Company ("ASC"), a subsidiary of Arabian American Oil
Company ("Aramco"). Id. ASC is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Houston, Texas. Id. In 1980, Mr. Boureslan transferred from ASC in
Houston to Aramco in Saudi Arabia. Id. Aramco is a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia and is licensed to do business in
Texas. Id.
8. Brief of Appellant at 4, Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (No. 87-2206),
reh g en banc granted, 863 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Brief of Appellant). In
February 1982, Mr. Boureslan submitted a formal grievance against his supervisor,
and an apology was issued. Id.
9. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1016. Mr. Boureslan alleged that following his submis-
sion of the formal grievance, Aramco and ASC "manipulated their policies and pro-
cedures to create a record that would justify [Mr. Boureslan's] termination." Brief of
Appellant, supra note 8, at 4.
10. Boureslan v. Aramco, 653 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Tex. 1987), afftd, 857 F.2d
1014, rehg en banc granted, 863 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1988).
11. Brief of Appellant, supra note 8, at 4-5. Mr. Boureslan alleged that his "dis-
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States, the district court confronted the threshold question of
whether Title VII applied to U.S. citizens employed abroad.' 2
Finding that Title VII has no extraterritorial application,13 the
charge was pretextual in nature and that [he] was discharged because of his race,
religion, and national origin." Id. at 5.
12. Boureslan, 653 F. Supp. at 629. Federal subject matter jurisdiction was predi-
cated on Title VII. Id. Therefore, the district court was forced to decide the thresh-
old question of whether Title VII applied to the employment of U.S. citizens abroad
before reaching the merits of Mr. Boureslan's claim. See MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420
U.S. 799, 803 (1975); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 540 (1972).
13. Boureslan, 653 F. Supp. at 629. The court first examined Title VII's lan-
guage. As the statute does not affirmatively state the scope of its jurisdiction, the
court focused on the so-called "alien exemption provision," which provides that
"[Title VII] shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens
outside any State." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (1982). The court considered a series of
district court cases that interpreted the provision to extend coverage to U.S. citizens
employed abroad. See, e.g., Bryant v. International Schools Servs., 502 F. Supp. 472,
482 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982) (alien exemption
provision reveals that Congress intended Title VII to protect U.S. citizens employed
abroad); Love v. Pullman Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423, 426 n.4 (D. Colo.
1976), aff'd on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1978) (alien exemption provi-
sion means that Title VII applies to U.S. citizens employed outside the United
States); see also infra notes 101-108 and accompanying text. The Boureslan court did
not mention Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F. Supp. 590, 592 (D. Md. 1986)
(alien exemption provision brings within Title VII U.S. citizens employed abroad by
U.S. companies), the most recent case that accords with Bryant and Love. See infra
notes 109-12 and accompanying text. The court also considered a Supreme Court
case that construed the provision to cover aliens employed within the United States
without expressing any opinion as to the coverage of U.S. citizens employed outside
the United States. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973); infra notes
93-99 and accompanying text. Without explanation, the Boureslan court rejected the
former construction as "suspect." See Boureslan, 653 F. Supp. at 630.
The court further found that Title VII's legislative history revealed no indication
that Congress was concerned with discrimination abroad. Id.
The district court compared Title VII to the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (the "ADEA"), which, as originally enacted, did not expressly provide for extra-
territorial application. Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 11, 81 Stat. 602, 605-07 (1967) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982 & Supp. IV); see Boureslan, 653 F. Supp. at 631.
In 1984, Congress strengthened the ADEA, adding explicit language covering U.S.
citizens employed abroad. Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-459, § 802(a), 98 Stat. 1767, 1792 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1982)). The
legislative history of the ADEA amendment reveals that the drafters' purpose was to
close the loophole created by courts that construed the ADEA not to cover older U.S.
citizens employed abroad. See Age Discrimination and Overseas Americans, 1983: Hearing
on S. 558 Before the Subcomm. on Aging of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1983) (opening statement of Senator Charles E.-Grassley,
subcommittee chairman). The district court concluded from the development of the
ADEA and from the absence of similarly explicit language in Title VII that Congress
intended Title VII to apply only within the United States. Boureslan, 653 F. Supp. at
631; see infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
Finally, the court suggested that a "potential conflict" between Title VII and
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district court dismissed Mr. Boureslan's claim for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.14
In his appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, '5 Mr. Boureslan maintained that the existing authority
mandates the extraterritorial application of Title VII.' 6 The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC" or
the "Commission"), the executive agency charged with ad-
ministering and enforcing Title VII, 7 submitted an amicus cu-
riae brief on Mr. Boureslan's behalf.' s In its brief, the EEOC
argued that Title VII protects all U.S. citizens from employ-
ment discrimination by a U.S. company regardless of the place
of employment.' 9 Aramco contended that Title VII's language
and legislative history did not support extraterritorial applica-
tion.20
The Fifth Circuit in Boureslan began its analysis of Title VII
by invoking the presumption against extraterritoriality. 21
Under this standard, courts presume that U.S. legislation is
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States unless a contrary congressional intent appears. 22
Saudi Arabia's Labor and Workman Law of 1959 is one of the "significant policy
reasons for not applying Title VII abroad." Boureslan, 653 F. Supp. at 631. The court
did not, however, specify any actual conflict. See infra notes 138-42 and accompany-
ing text.
14. Boureslan, 653 F. Supp. at 631.
15. Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014, reh g en bane granted. 863 F.2d 8 (5th
Cir. 1988).
16. Brief of Appellant, supra note 8, at 6.
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1982). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 created the
EEOC and delegated to the agency the primary responsibility to administer and en-
force Title VII. Id.; see EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 61-62 (1984).
18. Brief of the Equal 'Employment Opportunity Commission Atnjicus Curiae,
Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (No. 87-2206), reh 'g en banc grated, 863 F.2d 8
(5th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter EEOC Brief].
19. Id. at 6. The EEOC argued that Title VII's language and legislative history
revealed congressional intent to cover U.S. citizens employed abroad. Id. at 6-14.
The agency further argued that its consistent interpretation of Title VII is entitled to
judicial deference. Id. at 15-16. Finally, the EEOC argued that the application of
Title VII to the employment abroad of U.S. citizens does not conflict with principles
of international law or infringe on Saudi Arabian sovereignty. Id. at 16-20.
20. Brief of Appellee Arabian American Oil Company ("Aramco"), Boureslan v.
Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (No. 87-2206), reh'g en bane granted, 863 F.2d 8 (5th Cir.
1988).
21. Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014, 1016-17, reh'gen banc granted, 863 F.2d
8 (5th Cir. 1988).
22. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952) ("This Court
has often stated that the legislation of Congress will not extend beyond the bounda-
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In order to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial-
ity, the court sought in Title VII a "clear congressional expres-
sion of intent" to apply the statute abroad.2 3
To ascertain congressional intent, the Court of Appeals
first examined Title VII's language. As Title VII does not ex-
plicitly state that it applies abroad, the court focused on the
alien exemption provision, which states that Title VII shall not
apply to the employment of aliens abroad.24 The court noted
that the provision had been construed in two ways: to mean
that Title VII covers U.S. citizens employed abroad, 5 and to
mean that Title VII covers aliens employed within the United
States.26 The court concluded that because the same language
had supported two different constructions,27 the alien exemp-
tion provision alone did not warrant a construction that over-
comes the presumption against extraterritoriality. 2 s
Second, the Court of Appeals considered Title VII's legis-
lative history. 29 The court examined the House Reports ac-
ries of the United States unless a contrary legislative intent appears."); Foley Bros.,
Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) ("The canon of construction which teaches
that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States ... is a valid approach whereby
unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained." (citation omitted)).
23. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1017.
24. See id. at 1018. The alien exemption provision provides that "[Title VIIl
shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any
State .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l.
25. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1018 (citing Bryant v. International Schools Servs.,
502 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982)).
26. Id. (citing Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973)). Compare Seville
v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F. Supp. 590, 592 (D. Md. 1986) (holding that Title VII
protects U.S. employees in West Germany from employer's sex discrimination) with
Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973) (finding that Title VII permitted
resident alien to bring discrimination suit against employer). See iifra notes 93-100,
109-12 and accompanying text.
27. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1018. The court stated, "[w]e do not face a choice
between attaching [the extraterritorial interpretation] to the alien exemption provi-
sion or stripping the provision of all purpose. If we decline to give the alien exemp-
tion provision the interpretation [favoring extraterritoriality], the provision still is a
meaningful and useful part of [Title VII]." Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1019-20. The court considered four statements in the legislative his-
tory. First, a House Report that accompanied Title VII to the Senate in which Title
VII's passage was declared necessary "[tlo remove obstructions to the free flow of
interstate and foreign commerce and to insure the complete and full enjoyment by all
persons of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured and protected by the Con-
stitution." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 26 (1963), reprinted in
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companying Title VII and concluded that they did not contain
the clear expression of congressional intent required to over-
come the presumption against extraterritoriality. 30
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the
EEOC's interpretation of Title VII is generally entitled to def-
erence, 31 the Boureslan court asserted that this case warranted
less deference than usual.3 2 In a footnote, the court noted that
because the issue was a jurisdictional one in which the EEOC
had developed no particular expertise, it would not defer to
the Commission's view that Title VII applies abroad. 3
1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2391, 2402. Second, the court considered
the statement by Representative William McCulloch, ranking minority member of the
Judiciary Committee, that "[a] key purpose of the bill, then, is to secure to all Ameri-
cans the equal protection of the laws of the United States and of the several States."
Id. at pt. 2, at 1, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2488. Third,
the court considered another statement in the same report-that "[t]he rights of citi-
zenship mean little if an individual is unable to gain the economic wherewithall to
enjoy or properly utilize them." Id. at 29, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 2516. Fourth, the court considered a committee hearing on the bill that
was later enacted as Title VII. Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152, as amended by Sub-
comm. No. 5 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [herein-
after Hearings on H.R. 7152]. A house report submitted at this hearing explained that
"[t]he intent of the [alien] exemption [provision] is to remove conflicts of law which
might otherwise exist between the United States and a foreign nation in the employ-
ment of aliens outside the United States by an American enterprise." H.R. REP. No.
570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 7152, supra, at 2303; see infra
notes 116-28 and accompanying text.
30. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1020.
31. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973) (finding that the
EEOC's interpretation of Title VII is "entitled to great deference"); see in/ra notes 93-
100 and accompanying text (discussing the Espinoza case). In Chevron U.S.A. v. Na-
tional Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the United States Supreme
Court established an analytical regime that requires a court to defer to an administra-
tive agency's "permissible" construction of ambiguous language in a statute for
which it is responsible. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44; see infra notes 67-76 and accom-
panying text (setting forth the Chevron analysis); infra notes 124-37 and accompanying
text (applying the Chevron analysis to the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII's extra-
territorial jurisdiction).
32. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1019 n,2.
33. Id. In footnote 2, the court stated:
In Espinoza... the Court noted that the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII is
generally entitled to deference. However, such interpretations are not con-
trolling on the courts. Because this is a jurisdictional issue with little or no
statutory language or legislative history, and one in which the EEOC has
developed no particular expertise, we give the EEOC's interpretation less
deference than usual. This is particularly appropriate given the traditional
presumption against extraterritoriality.
Id.; see infra notes 67-76 and accompanying text; infra notes 124-37 and accompany-
ing text.
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The Court of Appeals concluded that neither Title VII's
language nor its legislative history manifested congressional
intent sufficient to overcome the presumption against extrater-
ritoriality 4 Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the action. 5
II. PRINCIPLES OF EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
OF FEDERAL STATUTES
A sovereign nation has jurisdiction to prescribe law regu-
lating the conduct of its nationals both within and without its
territory.3 6 Congress, therefore, has the power to extend the
reach of U.S. statutes to U.S. citizens outside the United
States.3 7 Whether Congress has exercised this power with re-
spect to any particular statute is primarily a matter of statutory
34. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1021; see infra notes 113-23 and accompanying text.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282 (1952); Foley Bros.,
Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421,
436 (1932); Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 54-56 (1924). Jurisdiction to prescribe law
refers to a state's authority to make its law applicable to persons or activities. RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401(a)
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT THIRD]. Territoriality and nationality are the prin-
cipal independent bases ofjurisdiction to prescribe law. Id. § 402 comment a. The
territoriality principle confers upon a state jurisdiction over conduct that occurs
within its borders. Id. § 402(1)(a)-(b) & comment c. The territoriality principle in-
cludes the "effects" doctrine, which confers jurisdiction over conduct that occurs
outside a state but that has or is intended to have substantial effect within it. Id,
§ 402(0)(c), comment d. The nationality principle confers upon a state jurisdiction
over the conduct of its nationals outside as well as within its territory. Id. § 402(2).
The nationality principle applies to both natural and juridical persons-the national-
ity of a juridical person being that of the state under whose laws it was organized. Id
§ 402 comment e. The nationality principle, therefore, supports U.S. jurisdiction to
prescribe its laws extraterritorially to U.S. citizens. See, e.g., Steele, 344 U.S. at 282
(applying the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986), to conduct of U.S. citizen in Mexico).
37. See, e.g., Steele, 344 U.S. at 282 ("Congress in prescribing standards of con-
duct for American citizens may project the impact of its laws beyond the territorial
boundaries of the United States."); Foley, 336 U.S. at 284 (Congress has power to
extend Eight Hour Laws, Act of Aug. 1, 1892, ch, 352, 27 Stat, 340 (current version
at 40 U.S.C. §§ 328-333 (1982)), to work performed by U,S. citizens for U.S. contrac-
tor in Iraq and Iran); Blackmer, 284 U.S, at 436 (U.S. citizen residing abroad remains
bound by U.S. laws applicable to his situation and therefore is subject to subpoena);
Cook, 265 U.S. at 54-56 (Congress has power to tax income received by a U.S. citizen
residing abroad from property situated abroad). See generally Note, Predictability and
Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1310,
1311-18 (1985) (reviewing approaches to extraterritorial jurisdiction in the areas of
antitrust, securities regulation, and foreign trade controls).
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construction. In addition to construing a statute's language
and legislative history,39 a court may consider the interpreta-
tion, if any, given a statute by the executive agency that is re-
sponsible for its administration 40 as well as relevant principles
of international law.4 1
A. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Under prevailing principles of statutory construction, fed-
eral legislation is presumed to apply only within the territorial
limits of the United States unless a contrary congressional in-
tent appears. 42 Congressional intent to apply a statute extra-
territorially may be ascertained primarily from the statutory
language.43
The "plain meaning rule" of construction, rooted in Eng-
lish jurisprudence, embodied the primacy of statutory lan-
guage. 4 Under this rule, courts rejected extrinsic interpretive
38. Steele, 344 U.S. at 282-83 (whether Lanham Act applies to acts by a U.S.
citizen in Mexico "depends on construction of exercised congressional power, not
the limitations upon that power itself"); Foley, 336 U.S. at 284-85 ("The question...
is not the power of Congress to extend the Eight Hour Law to work performed in
foreign countries [for] such power exists. The question is rather whether Congress
intended to make the law applicable to such work." (citations omitted)).
39. See, e.g., Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians,
466 U.S. 765, 772-84 (1984) (construing the language and legislative history of § 4(e)
of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 797(c) (1982)); ee ii f-a notes ,13-66 and :ccom-
panying text.
40. See, e.g-., Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984) (deferring to the EPA's interpretation of terms used in the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1982)); see infa notes 67-76 and ac-
companying text.
41. See, e.g., Steele, 344 U.S. at 280 (considering principles of international law
before applying U.S. trademark law to acts occurring in Mexico); Laker Airways v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 945-56 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (considering
principles of concurrent jurisdiction and international comity before applying U.S.
antitrust law abroad); see infra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
42. Steele, 344 U.S. at 285; Foley, 336 U.S. at 284-85.
43. See, e.g., Park 'N Fly v. Dollar Park and Fly, 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) ("Statu-
tory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the as-
sumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legisla-
tive purpose."); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (" '[Olur
starting point must be the language employed by Congress,' and we assume 'that the
legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.' " (cita-
tion omitted)); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("It is elemen-
tary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the lan-
guage in which the act is framed .... ).
44. See R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 229-
33 (1975);J. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 54-55 (1982); Wald, Some Observations on
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aids such as legislative history in favor of the plain meaning of
a statute's language.45 Increasingly, however, statutory lan-
guage has been interpreted with reference to legislative his-
tory.46 Under current doctrine, statutory interpretation begins
with "the language of the statute itself," and "[a]bsent a clearly
expressed legislative intention to the contrary, [statutory] lan-
guage must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive. '47 The bur-
den therefore rests on a statute's legislative history to clarify
any ambiguity that may exist in the statutory language.48
Courts have used both explicit and general jurisdictional
language to apply statutes extraterritorially. For example, in
1984, Congress strengthened the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (the "ADEA")49 by adding explicit language cov-
ering U.S. citizens employed abroad. 50  As amended, the
ADEA states that "any employee who is a citizen of the United
States employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign
country" is entitled to its protection. 5'
the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 195-97
(1982).
45. See, e.g., Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485 ("Where the language is plain and admits
of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules
which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion."); Hamilton v. Rathbone,
175 U.S. 414, 419 (1899) ("[W]here [an] act is clear upon its face, and when standing
alone it is fairly susceptible of but one construction, that construction must be given
to it.").
46. See Wald, supra note 44, at 197 ("In the 'orgy of statute making' ushered in
by the New Deal and continued relentlessly through the next fifty years, resort to
legislative history became pervasive.") (quoting G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN
LAw 95 (1977)).
47. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980). The Supreme Court has applied the Consumer Product formulation in numer-
ous subsequent cases involving statutory construction. See, e.g., Escondido Mutual
Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 772 (1984); American
Bank and Trust v. Dallas County, 463 U.S. 855, 862 (1983); Bread Political Action
Comm. v. Federal Election Comm., 455 U.S. 577, 580 (1982); Albernaz v. United
States, 450 U.S. 333, 336 (1981).
48. See Bread, 455 U.S. at 580; Schreck, Attorneys" Fees for Administrative Proceedings
Under the Education of the Handicapped Act: Of Carey, Crest Street and Congressional In-
tent, 60 TEMPLE L.Q. 599, 617-19 (1987); Wald, supra note 44, at 198-99 ("[T]he
[Supreme] Court now shifts onto legislative history the burden of proving that the
words do not mean what they appear to say.").
49. 29 U.S.C. § 621-34 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
50. Congress amended the ADEA as a part of the Older Americans Act Amend-
ments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, § 802(a), 98 Stat. 1792 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f).
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Explicit jurisdictional language, however, is not always re-
quired for a statute to apply extraterritorially. Courts have
found general coverage provisions sufficient to support extra-
territorial application of statutes that regulate U.S. foreign
commerce. 52 In such cases, the U.S. Constitution's grant to
Congress of jurisdiction over U.S. foreign commerce 53 is suffi-
cient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.54
For example, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (the "Sherman
Act")5 5 proscribes "[e]very contract, combination . . . , or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... with foreign na-
tions,"' 56 and penalizes "[e]very person who shall monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce . . . with foreign nations."57 Although the first
case on point rejected extraterritorial application of the Sher-
man Act,58 the current interpretation of this general jurisdic-
tional language is that anti-competitive acts of U.S. citizens
abroad that have a substantial effect upon U.S. foreign com-
merce are subject to the Sherman Act.59
Under the Lanham Trade-Mark Act (the "Lanham Act"),60
a trademark registrant has a cause of action against any person
who, "in commerce," uses or reproduces that trademark.61
52. See infra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
53. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
54. See infra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
57. Id. § 2.
58. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
59. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690,
704 (1962); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d
Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 609 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). For a discussion of the evolution of the "effects" doc-
trine, see I J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
§§ 6.01-.21 (2d ed. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1987); W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND
THE ANTITRUST LAWS §§ 2.1-.15 (3d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1988). See generally, Kintner &
Griffin,Jurisdiction over Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 18 B.C. INDUS.
& COM. L. REV. 199, 199-227 (1977) (discussing the expanding jurisdictional reach of
the Sherman Act); Ongman, "Be NVo Longer Chaos:" Constructing a Normative Theory of the
Sherman Act's Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Scope, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 733, 735-40 (1977)
(discussing limitations that have been imposed on the Sherman Act's jurisdictional
reach).
60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982 & Supp. IV).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1). Section 1114(1) provides in relevant part:
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"Commerce" means "all commerce which may lawfully be reg-
ulated by Congress" and therefore includes U.S. foreign com-
merce.62 In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. ,63 the Bulova Watch Com-
pany sued a U.S. citizen who held the trademark "Bulova" in
Mexico and assembled and sold watches under that name ex-
clusively in Mexico. 64 The Supreme Court found that because
Congress's commerce power includes the power to regulate
U.S. foreign commerce, the Lanham Act's general jurisdic-
tional language supported jurisdiction over the acts of trade-
mark infringement in Mexico.65 Since Bulova, several courts
have construed the Lanham Act to sustain jurisdiction over ex-
traterritorial conduct.66
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colora-
ble imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering
for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered
mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imi-
tation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or adver-
tisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with
the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or serv-
ices on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive [sic].
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
provided.
Id. (emphasis added).
62: 15 U.S.C. § 1127; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
63. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
64. Id. at 281-82.
65. Id. at 286.
66. See, e.g., American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d
408, 412-13 (5th Cir. 1983) (sales of products bearing infringing marks consum-
mated in Saudi Arabia and none of those products found their way into the United
States); Ramirez & Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co., 146 F. Supp. 594, 600-
01 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (infringing marks affixed to products in Mexico and products sold
in Mexico). But see Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co., 769 F.2d 1393, 1395
(9th Cir. 1985) (finding that interests of and links to U.S. foreign commerce of extra-
territorial activity in question were insufficient to bring the activity under the Lanham
Act); American White Cross Labs, Inc. v. H.M. Cote, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 753, 757
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Congress did not intend that ... the [Lanham] Act should reach
'acts committed by a foreign national in his home country under a presumably valid
trademark registration in that country.' " (quoting Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton
Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956)).
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B. Deferenee to Administrative Agen y Intrpyttation
The U.S. Supreme Court long has recognized that "eon-
siderable weight should be accorded to an executive depart-
ment's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to ad-
minister."' t67 In Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil,"" the Supreme Court enunciated an analytical regime for
reviewing the appropriate administrative agency's construction
of a statute."0 Under the Chevron regime, if a court finds that
Congress has expressed its intent unambiguously, both the
court and the agency must effectuate that intent.70  Alterna-
tively, if the court determines that Congress has not directly
addressed a precise issue, it may not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as in the absence of an administra-
tive interpretation. 7' Rather, the court must defer to the
agency's interpretation if it is based upon a "permissible" con-
struction of the statute.72
Whether an agency's construction is permissible will de-
pend on the nature of the agency's delegated authority. 73
67. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984); see also Aluminum Co. of America v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467
U.S. 380, 389-90 (1984) (upholding the interpretation of Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act by federal agency responsible for marketing
federal hydroelectric power in the Pacific Northwest); Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60,
75 (1975) (deferring to the EPA's interpretation of the Clean Air Amendments of
1970); Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Work-
ers, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961) (deferring to Atomic Energy Commission's interpreta-
tion of its duties under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954); NLRB v. Hearst Publica-
tions, 322 U.S. 11, 131 (1944) (deferring to the NLRB's interpretation of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act); United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 (1877) ("[Tlhe
construction given to a statute by those charged with the duty of executing it ...
ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons.").
,68. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
69. Id. at 842-43. The Chevron Court considered whether to defer to the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency's (the "EPA") definition of "stationary source" as used
in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685. Chevron,
467 U.S. at 840. After examining the relevant statutory language and legislative his-
tory, the Court held that the EPA's definition was entitled to deference. Id. at 842-
45.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 843.
72. Id. "The court need not conclude that the agency construction was the onvly
one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the read-
ing the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial pro-
ceeding." Id. at 843 n. II (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 843-44.
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Congressional empowerment of an executive agency to admin-
ister a statute necessarily includes the explicit or implicit dele-
gation of authority to formulate policy."4 An interpretation
pursuant to explicit delegation is permissible unless it is "arbi-
trary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
75
However, a reasonable interpretation pursuant to an implicit
delegation is permissible unless the statute or its legislative
history indicate that Congress would not have sanctioned it.
76
C. International Law
Two or more states may share jurisdiction to regulate the
same activity or conduct. The conduct or activity of one state's
national in the territory of another may confer concurrent ju-
risdiction to prescribe law-prescriptive jurisdiction-based
on principles of nationality and terrritoriality, respectively. 7
As these principles are not mutually exclusive, concurrent ju-
risdictional bases do not necessarily bar any state from exercis-
ing its jurisdiction to prescribe.78 The Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States ("Restatement
Third")79 has promulgated a test of reasonableness to evaluate
a state's exercise of its jurisdiction to prescribe.8 " Section 403
provides that a state may not prescribe laws having extraterri-
torial effect if, after "evaluating all relevant factors," it would
74. Id. at 843 (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
75. Id. at 844. An explicit delegation occurs when Congress has explicitly left a
gap in a statutory provision and authorized the agency to promulgate regulations to
fill that gap. Id. at 843-44. For example, § 245A(g)(1) of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act explicitly authorizes the Attorney General to "prescribe ... (A) regula-
tions establishing a definition of the term 'resided continuously', as used in this sec-
tion .... " 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(g)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
76. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45. An implicit delegation occurs when Congress
has implicitly left a gap in a statutory provision and thereby authorized the agency to
elucidate the provision. Id.
77. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286-87 (1952); Laker Airways
v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See generally
RESTATEMENT TmRo, supra note 36, § 402 comment b ("The exercise ofjurisdiction
both by the state of nationality and by the territorial state may result in overlap or
conflict, actual or potential, and may call for evaluation of the competing interests by-
a standard of reasonableness .... "). • I
78. See Laker, 731 FZd-A i%--t 5 Pi ioto, JnisldictionalConflicts, International Law
and the fnternationab.zmStSystem:;. 1 IINT'LJ. Soc. L. 11, 14, 25 (1983).; supra note 36 and
- accompanying- text.
79. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
80. See RESTATEMENT ThIRD, SUpra( note 36, §§ 402-03.
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be "unreasonable" to do so.8 ' This provision enumerates
eight such factors, encompassing considerations of territorial-
ity, nationality, the importance of the activity to the regulating
states and to the international legal system, and the likelihood
of conflict between the states' regulations.8 2 The official com-
ment to section 403 states that U.S. statutes are to be con-
strued consistently with that section unless such construction is
not fairly possible.8 3
Applying the Restatement Third reasonableness test, U.S.
courts generally have found that U.S. interests support the ex-
traterritorial application of U.S. statutes to U.S. citizens
abroad. 4 For example, in Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World
Airlines,"3 a U.K. airline alleged that a group of airlines con-
81. Id. § 403.
82. Id. The eight enumerated factors are:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substan-
tial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regula-
tion is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regula-
tion to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is gen-
erally accepted;
(d) the existence ofjustified expectations that might be protected or hurt
by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(0 the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id.; see Meessen, Conflicts of Jurisdiction Under the New Restatement, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
Summer 1987, at 47 (discussing the balancing of state interests under the Restate-
ment Third with respect to true and false conflicts ofjurisdiction); Rosenthal,Jurisdic-
tional Conflicts Between Sovereign Nations, 19 INT'L LAW. 487 (1985) (discussing the ori-
gins of and judicial responses to the reasonableness test).
83. Restatement Third, supra note 36, § 403 comment g.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1986)
(threshold issue of Congress's intent to apply U.S. narcotics statutes extraterritorially
is "reasonable"); Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 956
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (court's extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws to case
before it is "within the bounds of reason imposed by international law").
85. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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spired to implement an anti-competitive pricing scheme on
their United States-England routes.8 6 The D.C. Circuit found
that, although both the United States and England shared con-
current presciptive jurisdiction over the alleged conduct, ap-
plying the Sherman Act was reasonable given the strong U.S.
interest in maintaining free competition in its foreign com-
merce.
87
III. TITLE VII APPLIES TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF U.S.
CITIZENS EMPLOYED ABROAD
A. Overcoming the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality with
Language and Legislative History
Proper statutory construction of Title VII reveals congres-
sional intent that overcomes the presumption against extrater-
ritoriality. Title VII's language and its legislative history indi-
cate that Congress intended Title VII to protect U.S. citizens
from employers' unlawful employment practices regardless of
the place of employment.
1. Statutory Language
Title VII's basic coverage provision outlaws discrimination
against "any individual with respect to his .. .terms .. .of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." '88 The statute does not affirmatively
state the territorial boundaries of its application. The only ge-
ographic limitation on the coverage of "any individual" is
found in the alien exemption provision, which states that Title
VII "shall not apply to an employer with respect to the em-
ployment of aliens outside any State." 89 Because Title VII is a
remedial statute, it must be liberally construed.9" The lan-
86. Id. at 916-17, 955-56.
87. Id. at 956.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982) (emphasis added); see supra note 2.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (1982) (emphasis added); see supra note 24.
90. See Coles v. Penny, 531 F.2d 609, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("[T]itle VII is reme-
dial in character and should be liberally construed to achieve its purposes."); Reeb v.
Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 928 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[R]emedial
legislation such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is entitled to the benefit of
liberal construction."); Henderson v. Eastern Freight Ways, 460 F.2d 258, 260 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 912 (1972) ("[Title VII] is remedial in characterand should
be generously construed to achieve its purposes."). A remedial statute is one that
provides or improves a remedy to enforce rights or redress injuries. N. SINGER,
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guage of civil rights statutes generally must be given "broad
and inclusive effect," and their coverage extended as far as a
fair reading of the statute permits.9 ' Furthermore, the exemp-
tions from remedial statutes generally are to be narrowly con-
strued against those seeking to assert them.92
Federal courts vary in their interpretations of Title VII's
general coverage and alien exemption provisions. In Espinoza
v. Farah Mfg. Co.," the U.S. Supreme Court confronted the is-
sue of whether Title VII applies domestically to the employ-
ment of aliens. 94 In Espinoza, a Mexican citizen residing in the
United States alleged that an employer discriminated on the
basis of national origin in violation of Title VII by refusing to
hire aliens.95 The Court found that the exemption of aliens
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60.02, at 60 (4th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988)
[hereinafter SUTHERLAND]. Modern civil rights legislation is generally considered re-
medial. Id. at 61. "[The] legitimate purpose [of remedial statutes] is to advance
human rights and relationships." E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES
§ 252, at 494 (1940). Remedial statutes "should be given a liberal construction ...
and all matters fairly within the scope of such a statute should be included, even
though outside the letter, if within its spirit or reason." Id. at 492-93 (citations omit-
ted).
91. See Hartman v. Wick, 678 F. Supp. 312, 325 (D.D.C. 1988). The Hartman
court found that Title VII applies to non-resident aliens who apply for employment
within the United States because "courts must give the language of civil rights stat-
utes 'broad and inclusive effect,' and must extend their coverage to the outer limits
permitted from a fair reading of the statute." Id. (citing SUTHERLAND, supra note 90,
§ 74.05).
92. See Phillips Co. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945) ("Any exemption from
... remedial legislation must . . .be narrowly construed, giving due regard to the
plain meaning of statutory language and the intent of Congress. To extend an ex-
emption to other than those plainly and unmistakeably within its terms and spirit is to
abuse the interpretive process .... ); Piedmont & N.R. Co. v. ICC, 286 U.S. 299,
311-12 (1932) ("Exemptions from [the] sweep [of remedial legislation] should be
narrowed and limited to effect the remedy intended."); National Automatic Laundry
& Cleaning Council v. Schultz, 443 F.2d 689, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("Remedial legis-
lation is traditionally construed 'broadly to effectuate its purposes,' with exceptions
'narrowly construed.'" (quoting Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S; 388, 392
(1960))); Port of New York Authority v. Baker, Watts & Co., 392 F.2d 497, 504 (D.C.
Cir: 1968) ("Exceptions in a remedial statute must be narrowly construed.")'; see also
California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 618 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) ("A statute designed to remedy the national disgrace of discrimination in em-
ployment should be interpreted generously to comport with its primary purpose; ex-
emptions should be construed narrowly so as not to undermine the effect of the gen-
eral prohibition.").
93. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 87. Ms. Espinoza was a citizen of Mexico who resided in Texas. InJuly
1969, Ms. Espinoza applied for employment as a seamstress at the San Antonio divi-
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employed outside of any state implies that Title VII covers
aliens employed within the United States.96 The Court ex-
pressed no opinion, however, on the statute's extraterritorial
application for the benefit of U.S. citizens.97
The Espinoza holding supports Title VII's application to
the employment of U.S. citizens abroad. By its own terms, the
Espinoza construction of the alien exemption provision is not
exclusive of other constructions:9 8 The Court did not address
extraterritorial application, simply because the case did not
raise that issue.99 Since Espinoza, several district court cases
have addressed this precise issue and have construed the alien
exemption provision to mean that Title VII's coverage of "any
individual" includes U.S. citizens employed abroad. 00
Love v. Pullman Co., 10 the first district court case to ad-
dress Title VII's application to U.S. citizens employed abroad,
concerned the issue of whether the statute covered Canadian
railroad porters who worked both in Canada and the United
States.0 2 The court held that the alien exemption provision
meant that the alien porters were covered only to the extent
that they operated within the United States. 0 3 Consistent with
this holding, the court explained in dictum that the exemption
sion of Farah Manufacturing Company. Her application was rejected on the basis of
the company's policy not to hire aliens. Ms. Espinoza alleged that the policy violated
Title VII by discriminating against aliens on the basis of national origin. Id.
96. Id. at 95. Although the court found that Title VII protected aliens legally
within the United States, it held that the employer's refusal to hire aliens based on
lack of citizenship did not amount to discrimination on the basis of national origin. Id. at
95-96.
97. See id. at 87-96. The Supreme Court never has expressed an opinion regard-
ing the extraterritorial application of Title VII.
98. See id. at 95. '
99. Both employer and applicant for employment were within the United States.
See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
100. See Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F. Supp. 590, 592 (D. Md. 1986)
(alien exemption provision means that U.S. citizens employed abroad by U.S. compa-
nies are within the reach of Title VII)-; Bryant v. International Schools Servs., 502 F.
Supp. 472, 482-83 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982)
(alien exemption provision indicates that Congress intended Title VII to protect U.S.
citizens employed abroad); Love v. Pullman Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423,
426 n.4 (D. Colo. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1978) (alien
exemption provision means that Title VII applies equally to U.S. citizens abroad and
at home); see infra notes 10 1-15 and accompanying text.
101. 13 Fair Empl'. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 423.
102. Id. at 426.
103. Id.
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also means that Title VII covers U.S. citizens employed
abroad. '0 4
The employment of U.S. citizens abroad was the principal
issue in Bryant v. International Schools Services. 105 In Bryant, U.S.
citizens employed in Iran by a U.S. corporation alleged that
their employer's benefits policy was discriminatory on the basis
of sex in violation of Title VII. 10 6 The district court construed
the alien exemption provision to mean that Title VII applies to
the employment of U.S. citizens abroad.10 7 Accordingly, the
court held that Title VII does apply extraterritorially.' 0 8
In Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp. ,109 U.S. citizens employed
by Martin Marietta, a U.S. corporation in West Germany,
brought a sex discrimination suit against their employer under
Title VII.' 1° Addressing the extraterritorial application of Ti-
tle VII, the court found that the Espinoza and Bryant construc-
tions of the alien exemption provision are "parallel," not in-
104. Id. n.4. The court stated that
American citizens who were employed ... in Canada are entitled tofull relief
without any subtraction. This conclusion rests on the negative inference of
[the alien exemption provision]. Since Congress explicitly excluded aliens
employed outside of any state, it must have intended to provide relief to
American citizens employed outside of any state in an industry affecting
commerce by an employer otherwise covered under the Act.
Id. (emphasis added).
105. 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.NJ. 1980), rev'don other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir.
1982).
106. Id. at 479. In particular, the plaintiffs alleged that their employer's benefits
policy "resulted in disparate treatment and/or had a disparate impact on them." Id.
For a general discussion of "disparate impact" theory under Title VII, see Ruther-
glen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L.
REV. 1297 (1987).
107. Bryant, 502 F. Supp. at 482. The court stated that
The short answer to all of [the employers'] arguments against giving
extraterritorial effect to Title VII is that Congress has spoken on the subject
and that a fair interpretation of the statutory language leads to the conclu-
sion that Title VII is to be given extraterritorial effect.
... By negative implication, since Congress explicitly excluded aliens
employed outside of any state, it must have intended to provide relief to
non-aliens, i.e., American citizens, outside of any state ....
Id.
108. Id. at 483.
109. 638 F. Supp. 590 (D. Md. 1986).
110. Id. at 591-92. Four female employees challenged on "disparate impact"
grounds Martin Marietta's fringe benefit scheme pursuant to which 99% of the men
but only 22% of the women employed at the facility received benefits. Id. at 591-94.
For a general discussion of "disparate impact" theory under Title VII, see Ruther-
glen, supra note 106.
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consistent constructions."' The court followed the Bryant and
Love decisions and held that Title VII applies to the employ-
ment of U.S. citizens abroad." 2
Taken together, Title VII's general coverage and alien ex-
emption provisions compel the logical inference that Congress
intended the statute to cover the employment of U.S. citizens
abroad. First, the plain meaning of "any individual" in the
general coverage provision is not restricted to individuals
within the United States, for such a restriction would render
the distinction between alien and citizen labor in the alien ex-
emption provision superfluous."' 3 Put another way, it would
be unnecessary to exempt aliens employed abroad if no one were
covered abroad." 4 Second, because Congress exempted only
aliens employed abroad, "any individual" must include non-
aliens-U.S. citizens-employed abroad."'
2. Legislative History
Title VII's legislative history is scant with respect to the
statute's jurisdictional limits.'1 6 H.R. 7152, the 88th Con-
gress's precursor to Title VII, stressed the adverse effects of
employment discrimination on U.S. domestic and foreign com-
merce. 117 The bill's stated purposes were to remove obstruc-
111. Seville, 638 F. Supp. at 592.
112. Id.
113. See Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 286 (1949). In Foley, the
Supreme Court held that the Eight Hour Law does not extend to cover a U.S. citizen
employed abroad by a U.S. company. Id. The Court specifically noted that "[n]o
distinction is drawn [in the Eight Hour Law] between laborers who are aliens and
those who are citizens of the United States." Id. The Court concluded from the
absence of any such distinction that the statute was intended to apply "only to those
places where the labor conditions of both citizen and alien employees are a probable
concern of Congress [and not to] foreign countries." Id.
114. See Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014, 1032 (KingJ., dissenting), reh'g en
banc granted, 863 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1988).
115. See Seville, 638 F. Supp. at 592; Bryant v. International Schools Servs., 502
F. Supp. 472, 482-83 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'd on otherg-rounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982);
Love v. Pullman Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423, 426 n.4 (D. Colo. 1976),
aff'd on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1978).
116. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in 1964
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2391, 2402; H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1963); see Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1968); see also Bryant, 502 F.
Supp. at 483.
117. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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tions to U.S. domestic and foreign commerce" i8 and to secure
to all persons the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the
U.S. Constitution.'" As enacted, Title VII does not use the
term "foreign commerce," but the definition of "commerce"
under the statute includes commerce "between a state and any
place outside thereof."' 20 Accordingly, the statute's jurisdiction
reaches U.S. foreign commerce.
House Report 570 of the Committee on Education and
Labor,' 2' which was submitted in connection with H.R.
7152,122 explained that "[t]he intent of the [alien] exemption
[provision] is to remove conflicts of law which might otherwise ex-
ist between the United States and a foreign nation in the em-
ployment of aliens outside the United States by an American enter-
prise.' 23 This explanation of the alien exemption proyision
indicates that when Congress enacted Title VII, it was con-
cerned with the conflicts that might arise from its extraterrito-
rial application to the employment of aliens-but not U.S. citi-
zens-by U.S. employers. Title VII's legislative history there-
fore reinforces the plain meaning of the statutory language:
that Congress intended the statute to apply to employers with
respect to the employment of U.S. citizens outside the United
States.
B. The EEOC's Interpretation of Title VII Is Entitled to Deference
The EEOC has consistently taken the position that Title
VII protects U.S. citizens working abroad for U.S. employ-
ers.' 24 It has advanced this position in an EEOC administra-
tive decision,' 2 5 in amicus curiae briefs in federal cases,126 and in
118. Id. § 701(b)(1). Section (b)(l) stated that the legislation was necessary
"[t]o remove obstructions to the free flow of commerce among the States and with
foreign nations." Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id. § 701(b)(2). Section (b)(2) stated that the legislation was necessary
"[t]o insure the complete and full enjoyment by all persons of the rights, privileges,
and immunities secured and protected by the Constitution of the United States." Id.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added).
121. H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
122. See Hearings on H.R. 7152, supra note 29, at 2300 . House Report 570 was
originally submitted in connection with H.R. 405, an earlier precursor to Title VII in
the 88th Congress, and resubmitted in connection with H.R. 7152.
123. H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (emphasis added).
124. See EEOC Brief, supra note 18, at 15.
125. See EEOC Decision 85-16, Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 6856, at 7072 (Sept.
16, 1985).
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testimony before Congress.127 The Supreme Court has held
that the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII is "entitled to great
deference." 28
The Boureslan court's failure to defer to the EEOC's inter-
pretation of Title VII because the case involved the issue of
jurisdiction violated the analytical procedure established by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Chevron.1 29 As the Boureslan court
conceded, Title VII does not directly address extraterritorial
application. 3 0 Therefore, subject matter jurisdiction over the
employment of U.S. citizens abroad under Title VII requires
proper construction of the statute's language and legislative
history. 3 ' Given the EEOC's long-standing position on the is-
sue, a proper application of the Chevron analysis 3 2 would have
prohibited the Boureslan court from imposing its own interpre-
tation on the statute. 3 3 Congress did not explicitly direct the
EEOC to interpret Title VII's extraterritorial scope; therefore,
it is necessary to defer to the Commission's interpretation of
Title VIL's jurisdictional scope absent any indication that Con-
gress would not have sanctioned it.' 34
Title VII's language and legislative history reveal not only
126. See, e.g., EEOC Brief, supra note 18; Brief of Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission Amicus Curiae, Bryant v. International Schools Servs., 675 F.2d 562
(3d Cir. 1981) (Nos. 81-1558, 81-1559).
127. See Age Discrimination and Overseas Americans, 1983: Hearing on S. 558 Before the
Subcomm. on Aging of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4 (1983) [hereinafter ADEA Hearing] (statement of Clarence Thomas, Chairman,
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission); Letter from William A. Carey, EEOC
General Counsel, to Sen. Frank Church (Mar. 17, 1975), reprinted in Note, Civil Rights
in Employment and the Multinational Corporations, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 87, 104 (1976).
In his letter, the Chairman wrote: "Giving [the alien exemption provision] its normal
meaning would indicate a Congressional intent to exclude from the coverage of the
statute aliens employed by covered employers working in the employers' operations
outside the United States." Id. The letter continued: "If [the alien exemption provi-
sion] is to have any meaning at all, therefore, it is necessarv to construe it as expressing a
Congressional intent to extend coverage ... in overseas operations of domestic calporations at the
same time it excludes aliens of the domestic corporation from the operation of the
statute." Id. (emphasis added).
128. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973).
129. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
130. Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014, 1018, rehg en bancgranted, 863 F.2d 8
(5th Cir. 1988).
131. See supra notes 13-14.
132. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-
45 (1984); see supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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that Congress would have sanctioned the EEOC's interpreta-
tion, but that Congress intended precisely that result.I35 Addi-
tionally, when Congress amended the ADEA to cover U.S. citi-
zens employed abroad, one stated purpose was to conform the
statute's coverage to that of Title VII, which at the time had
been applied abroad. 3 6 At a Senate hearing on the ADEA
amendment, then General Counsel of the EEOC testified that
the ADEA should be amended to have the extraterritorial ap-
plication that courts had derived from Title VII's alien exemp-
tion provision.13 7 These statements during the ADEA hearing
further suggest that at the time Congress was amending the
ADEA to apply abroad, it was aware of-and apparently sanc-
tioned-courts' extraterritorial application of Title VII. Ac-
cordingly, under Chevron, the Boureslan court should have sus-
tained the EEOC's interpretation.
C. Principles of International Law Permit the Extraterritorial
Application of Title VII
The United States and Saudi Arabia share concurrent pre-
scriptive jurisdiction over the employment of U.S. citizens in
Saudi Arabia, based on nationality and territoriality principles,
respectively. 38  Because Congress can neither anticipate nor
resolve all conflicts with foreign countries' prescriptive juris-
diction, it expects the full participation of the courts in resolv-
135. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text; supra notes 116-30 and ac-
companying text.
136. SeeADEA Hearing, supra note 127, at 4. At the hearing, Senator Charles E.
Grassley, the subcommittee chairman, noted that "[t]he substantive provisions of the
ADEA track title VII, which has been held to apply overseas." Clarence Thomas,
then Chairman of the EEOC, testified that "the ADEA should be amended to provide
extraterritorial coverage to Americans working in foreign countries for American
companies [because of] Title VIll's extraterritorial application and the long-recognized
fact that the purposes and goals of the two statutes are parallel: to eliminate discrimi-
nation in employment." Id. (emphasis added).
137. Id. At the hearing, Clarence Thomas, then Chairman of the EEOC, stated:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, which EEOC also
enforces, does apply extraterritorially because § 702 of Title VII provides,
in pertinent part, "[Tihis subchapter shall not apply to an employer with
respect to the employment of aliens outside of any state .... " (emphasis
added). This provision indicates, by implication, that Congress intended Title
I'l to protect American employees working for American employers outside the 15nited
States.
Id. (emphasis added).
138. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
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ing such conflicts.' 39 Accordingly, where U.S. prescriptive ju-
risdiction overlaps with that of another state, current doctrine
requires courts to evaluate the reasonableness of asserting
U.S. jurisdiction on any given occasion.1 40
Extraterritorial application of Title VII serves both U.S.
and international interests. The United States's interest in
preventing discrimination against U.S. employees abroad is
considerable. Foreign assignment can be essential to career
advancement in a U.S. multinational enterprise.' 4 ' Accord-
ingly, unless Title VII prohibits unlawful discriminatory prac-
tices abroad as well as domestically, the career opportunities of
women and racial, ethnic, and religious minorities in U.S. mul-
tinational enterprises may be restricted. 142
Extraterritorial application of Title VII also complies with
the international consensus opposing discrimination in em-
ployment.143 Most developed nations are signatories to inter-
national instruments that condemn discrimination, such as the
International Labour Organization Convention Concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation,' 44
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination,14 ' and the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 4 ' The
139. See Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d at 952 (cit-
ing BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY No.
48 1, EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND CONFLICTS OF JURISDICTION 4 (1983)).
140. See, e.g., id. (considering the reasonableness of asserting U.S. jurisdiction
over extraterritorial anti-competitive activity); RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 36,
§ 403.
141. See, e.g., Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1192-93 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
142. See generally J. FERNANDEZ, RACISM AND SEXISM IN CORPORATE LIFE: CHANG-
ING VALUES IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1981) (discussing discrimination in the contem-
porary corporate setting).
143. See, e.g., Convention on Discrimination Against Women, supra note 6, at 39;
Convention on Racial Discrimination, snpra note 6, at 216. 220, 222; Convention
Concerning Employment Discrimination, supra note 6, at 32, 34; see supra note 6 for a
discussion of these conventions.
144. Supra note 6. Not fewer than 94 states have ratified this convention. See 2
WORLD TREATY INDEX 940-41 (2d ed. 1983).
145. Supra note 6. 131 states had ratified this convention as of December 31,
1987. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, STATUS
AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1987, at 103-04, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/6, U.N. Sales No.
E.88.V.3 (1988) [hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES STATUS].
146. Supra note 6. 114 states had ratified this convention as of December 31,
1987. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES STATUS, spa note 145, 160-61.
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United States has codified its opposition to employment dis-
crimination in Title VII. The ADEA further reflects the United
States's policy, prohibiting age discrimination against U.S. em-
ployees both domestically and abroad. 147 Therefore, applica-
tion of Title VII to discrimination against U.S. employees
outside the United States furthers both U.S. and international
policy opposing discrimination. Accordingly, it would be rea-
sonable to apply Title VII to the employment of U.S. citizens
by U.S. employers abroad.
CONCLUSION
The growing presence of minorities and women in an in-
creasingly multinational employment market demands vigilant
enforcement of civil rights legislation. The Boureslan decision
has left an ominous loophole that enables multinational em-
ployers to deny U.S. citizens in foreign countries the basic lib-
erties that Title VII was enacted to secure. This loophole must
be closed to enable minorities and women to participate in the
employment market free from the specter of discrimination.
Accordingly, Title VII must be construed to prohibit discrimi-
natory employment practices against U.S. employees abroad.
Lucien A. Moolenaar III*
147. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, 1990, Fordham University School of Law.
